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THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE: 
THE SCHMOOZE PROJECT 
MARK A. GRABER 
For more than twenty years, the participants in the Georgetown Consti-
tutional Law Schmooze, the Maryland/Georgetown Constitutional Law 
Schmooze, and now the Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze, as well as 
participants in constitutional law schmoozes at Princeton and Wisconsin, 
have engaged in a common enterprise that we might call “the schmooze pro-
ject.”  The existence and nature of any “schmooze project” is my synthesis, 
not the publicly acknowledged consensus of the whole.  Still, the papers sub-
mitted, conversations initiated, and scholarship published by schmooze par-
ticipants indicate that Georgetown, Princeton, Wisconsin, and Maryland have 
been sites for developing a distinctive approach to constitutionalism.  This 
distinctive approach provides important and better conceptual tools for un-
derstanding contemporary constitutional predicaments in the United States 
                                                          
© 2017 Mark A. Graber. 
 Regents Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.  Special thanks to President Jay 
Perman, Senior Vice President Bruce Jarrell, Dean Donald Tobin, and (happily in his mind) former 
Associate Dean Maxwell Stearns for their extraordinary efforts that made this talk possible.  The 
list of schmoozers and colleagues to thank would be nearly endless.  The great difficulty giving a 
talk and writing papers at a certain stage of your career is that by the time you reach that stage of 
your career when someone might ask you to talk about your ideas, you can no longer distinguish 
your ideas from those of your friends, colleagues and family.  What seems today’s fresh insight, I 
fear, was first suggested by Sandy Levinson, Leslie Goldstein, Keith Whittington, Rogers Smith, 
Emily Zackin, Linda McClain or one of the hundreds of other schmoozers, in their contributions to 
a past Schmooze, or perhaps in a more offhand comment during the Schmooze’s traditional Friday 
night Indian buffet during a schmooze five years ago, or offered during a Maryland Law faculty 
workshop by Maxwell Stearns, Jana Singer, Donald Gifford, Danielle Citron, Taunya Banks, Rich-
ard Boldt or another of my wonderful colleagues.  The thought may have even come from Dr. Julia 
Frank as an aside when we were watching the latest Murdoch Mystery.  The best I can hope is you 
have forgotten your insight or that you forgive my more frequent lapses of memory.  
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and abroad, and for reforming contemporary constitutional institutions to 
meet unprecedented challenges to constitutional democracy. 
Schmoozers in this symposium and elsewhere are replacing a New Deal 
conceptual universe structured by a sharp distinction between law and poli-
tics with a conceptual universe structured by constitutional politics.  Consti-
tutional politics consists of the struggles between proponents of different con-
stitutional visions that take place throughout the political universe.  
Constitutional politics occurs, for example, when national political parties 
write platforms committing their coalition to repealing race based prefer-
ences in university admissions, when state governors veto legislation repeal-
ing such measures, and when courts declare that elected officials may use 
race to promote diversity, but not to compensate for general societal disad-
vantage.1  People engage in constitutional politics when they protest volun-
tary prayers at town council meetings, ask their neighbor to sign petitions 
calling for an end to those prayers, and litigate the relevant establishment 
clause issues before high courts.2  The constitutional law of the land at any 
particular time is a complex amalgam of all these practices, not simply a syn-
thesis of opinions written by Supreme Court Justices. 
This Essay begins by describing briefly how the New Deal conceptual 
universe we inherited as scholars was largely limited to delineating and often 
attempting to enforce different manifestations of the law/politics distinction.  
Part II details how schmoozers for a generation have undermined that 
law/politics distinction as a foundation for studying constitutional institu-
tions, the allocation of constitutional authority, constitutional practice, and 
constitutional history.  Part III introduces readers to the notion of constitu-
tional politics and the tools constitutional politics provides for understanding 
constitutional practice in the United States and other constitutional democra-
cies.  Part IV elaborates how constitutional politics provides better concep-
tual tools for identifying the underlying causes of constitutional crises 
throughout the contemporary constitutional universe and for thinking about 
how political actors might maintain constitutional democracy in the United 
States during the age of Donald Trump and abroad in the face of contempo-
rary challenges. 
The pages below have three central purposes.  The first is to identify a 
cohort of scholars that I believe to be united by a common project of collaps-
ing a New Deal conceptual universe structured by an iron distinction between 
law and politics.  The second is to suggest that rather than distinguish be-
tween law and politics—and insist that courts remain in the law lane—con-
stitutional scholarship would be better off thinking about better and worse 
                                                          
 1.  See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 2.  See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 110 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:108 
 
ways in which law and politics are mutually constructive.  The third is to 
continue the moves, particular in American constitution scholarship from 
constitutional law, the constitutional rules made by the Supreme Court of the 
United States and other judicial tribunals, to constitutional design, the insti-
tutional rules and practice that structure constitutional and political deci-
sionmaking, to the nature of the entire constitutional regime.  This Essay out-
lines the ways in which politics, law, economics, culture and other factors 
might interact to construct a healthy constitutional regime and, in present cir-
cumstances, how those factors are undermining the American constitutional 
regime and other constitutional democracies. 
I.  THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE 
American constitutional and legal thought when older members of the 
schmooze generation came of age was structured by a sharp division between 
law and politics.  Virtually every major piece of scholarship published in law 
and political science probed some aspect of this division.  The distinction 
between law and politics provided the underlying structure to works explor-
ing the institutional responsibilities of the different governing branches, elab-
orating the justificatory logics legitimately available to each governing insti-
tution, discussing the allocation of constitutional authority, detailing 
American constitutional development, and explaining judicial decisionmak-
ing.  Prominent titles included “Law or Politics,” “Is Law Politics,” or simi-
lar.3 
A remarkable range of scholars shared this concern with elaborating the 
distinction between law and politics.  The not-so-short list would include 
what the law professor Mark Tushnet describes as doing “grand [constitu-
tional] theory”4 and what the political scientist Nancy Maveety describes as 
“pioneers of judicial behavior.”5  No brief composite can do justice to the 
richness of that scholarship, capture important nuances in how different 
scholars conceptualized the law/politics distinction, or acknowledge fully 
how prominent works sometimes deviated from the New Deal/Great Society 
orthodoxy.  Henry Hart and Robert Bork differed in significant ways, as did 
                                                          
 3.  See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? (1994); 
Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Con-
firmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988). 
 4.  MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1 (2015).  Grand constitutional theorists include Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, John 
Hart Ely, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork, and Henry Hart. 
 5.  THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy L. Maveety ed., 2003).  Pioneers of judicial 
behavior include C. Herman Pritchett, Glendon Schubert, Harold Spaeth, David Danelski, Edward 
Corwin, Alpheus Thomas Mason, and Robert McCloskey. 
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Robert McCloskey and Harold Spaeth.  Nevertheless, with all the usual ca-
veats about grand syntheses,6 the paragraphs below roughly capture the con-
ceptual universe in which constitutional thought occurred during the New 
Deal and Great Society. 
Robert McCloskey and Herbert Wechsler, whose works betray little or 
no awareness of the other despite their respective prominence in law and po-
litical science, each elaborated a common institutional division of labor that 
structured constitutional investigation in their disciplines.  Politics was an 
arena for policymaking and interest group bargaining.  Law was the site for 
working out fundamental regime principles or reasoned elaboration in the 
“forum of principle.”7  McCloskey, a distinguished professor of political sci-
ence at Harvard, in his classic The American Supreme Court maintained that 
elected officials represented the democratic commitments of constitutional 
democracy, while Justices represented the constitutional commitments of 
constitutional democracy.  “The legislature,” he wrote, 
with its power to initiate programs and policies, to respond to the 
expressed interest of the public, embodied the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty.  The courts, generally supposed to be without will as 
Hamilton said, generally revered as impartial and independent, fell 
heir almost by default to the guardianship of the fundamental law.8 
Wechsler, in the most cited quotation in one of the top five cited law 
review articles of all time,9 proffered the same institutional functions when 
maintaining that elected officials appropriately pursued expedience while 
courts pursued principle.  “[P]rinciples are largely instrumental as they are 
employed in politics,” he declared, 
instrumental in relation to results that a controlling sentiment de-
mands at any given time.  Politicians recognize this fact of life and 
are obliged to trim and shape their speech and votes accord-
ingly . . . . 
  . . . [But] are you not also ready to agree that something else is 
called for from the courts?  I put it to you that the main constituent 
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely princi-
pled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching 
                                                          
 6.  TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 7.  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985). 
 8.  ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 7–8 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
6th ed. rev. 2016). 
 9.  See Fred Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
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judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immedi-
ate result that is achieved.10 
This consensus that elected officials represented democratic commit-
ments, while judges represented constitutional commitments, explains why 
constitutional thinkers during the New Deal and Great Society thought that 
only judicial decisionmaking required constitutional justification.  The prin-
ciple of majority rule or political accountability explained why elected offi-
cials who represented the popular sovereignty commitments of American 
constitutionalism could make whatever decisions they believed best facili-
tated their reelection.  Supreme Court Justices who were not elected could 
not point to the same democratic commitments when declaring laws uncon-
stitutional.  When Supreme Court decisions overturned policies adopted by 
democratically elected officials, their rulings presented what Alexander 
Bickel labelled the countermajoritarian difficulty.  “[W]hen the Supreme 
Court declares [a law] unconstitutional,” Bickel wrote, “it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now.”11  This counterma-
joritarian difficulty, which was the central obsession of New Deal constitu-
tional thought,12 could be overcome, if overcome at all, only by demonstra-
tions that the antidemocratic decisions of the federal judiciary were a faithful 
exercise of the judicial obligation to adhere to the constitutional commit-
ments of American constitutionalism.  Judicial supremacy followed from this 
institutional logic.  Courts had the ultimate authority to determine what the 
Constitution means because courts were the only institution that had the ob-
ligation and might be expected to determine what the constitution means.  
Henry Hart insisted the Supreme Court: 
is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of 
Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the 
structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged 
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating 
and developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional 
law . . . .13 
This demand that Justices make decisions on law rather than politics 
framed the central questions of both legal and public law scholarship during 
                                                          
 10.  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
14–15 (1959). 
 11.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962). 
 12.  See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
 13.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959). 
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the second half of the twentieth century.  Academic lawyers asked how Jus-
tices could make decisions based on law rather than on politics.  They de-
voted their energies to developing grand theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion that provided members of the Supreme Court with the algorithms 
necessary for grounding their rulings in constitutional logics sufficient to 
overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty.14  Social scientists meanwhile, 
claiming to “grind no ideological axes,”15 asked whether Justices were actu-
ally making decisions based on law rather than politics.  They devoted their 
energies to plotting regression lines demonstrating that what law professors 
claimed were legal decisions were, in fact, grounded in the same factors as 
the decisions made by political actors in the rest of the constitutional system.  
Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, the two leading proponents of the attitudinal 
model, insisted: 
the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case 
vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.  
Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is ex-
tremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he 
was extremely liberal.16 
Wechsler and Spaeth disputed whether Justices based decisions on law or on 
politics, but they shared a common understanding of law as principled, of 
politics as policymaking and of the law/politics distinction.17 
The study of American constitutional development was structured by 
the institutional division of labor underlying the distinction between law and 
politics.  Constitutional history was the history of constitutional law, which 
included the processes by which constitutional texts were framed and ratified.  
Constitutional histories largely passed over the annexation of Texas because 
those constitutional debates occurred outside the courts.18  Conventional 
works led readers to believe that Americans began debating the constitutional 
status of bans on slavery in American territories  during the run-up to Dred 
                                                          
 14.  TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 1. 
 15.  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL xv (1993).  Law professors, in turn, rarely referred to the empirical literature on courts.  See 
Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and neglected 
Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 314–16 (2002). 
 16.  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). 
 17.  Compare WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 14–15, with SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 16, at 
44–114. 
 18.  For a discussion of the constitutional debates over the annexation of Texas, see Mark A. 
Graber, Settling the West: the Annexation of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in 
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM, 1803–1898, at 83 (Sanford Levinson 
& Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005). 
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Scott v. Sandford,19 rather than in 1820 when Congress considered the Mis-
souri Compromise.20  Restricting constitutional history to the evolution of 
Supreme Court doctrine made sense because Justices were the only persons 
in the American constitutional order who made any pretense of justifying 
their decisions on constitutional grounds.  Ignoring Charles Fairman’s advice 
that “the historian of the Court should keep his watch in the halls of Congress, 
not linger within the chamber of the Court,”21 few students of American con-
stitutional development tarried long in legislative halls, executive mansions 
or public streets.  The political actors in those venues, conventional wisdom 
maintained, had no obligation to provide constitutional grounds for their be-
havior, did not provide constitutional grounds for their behavior, or, when 
they provided constitutional grounds for the behavior, did so insincerely.22 
Scholarship that reduced American constitutional development to the 
history of constitutional law took Supreme Court decisions as the authorita-
tive statement of American constitutional practice at any given time.  Mar-
bury v. Madison23 established the judicial power to declare laws unconstitu-
tional because Marbury was the first judicial decision holding that the 
Supreme Court had the power to declare laws unconstitutional.24  Brown v. 
Board of Education25 desegregated public schools because that judicial deci-
sion declared Jim Crow education unconstitutional.26  Implementation was a 
problem for public policy, not for constitutional law or theory. 
The role of the constitutional historian and of constitutional history, 
when not purely descriptive, was to separate judicial decisions based on law 
from judicial decisions based on politics.27  McCulloch v. Maryland,28 which 
held that Congress had the power to incorporate a national bank, and the cru-
cial Supreme Court decisions sustaining Roosevelt administration policies 
                                                          
 19.  60 U.S. (19. How.) 393 (1857). 
 20.  For the discussion of the constitutionality of banning slavery in the territories that took 
place during the debates over the Missouri Compromise, see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND 
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 121–22 (2006). 
 21.  CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–1888, at 118 (1971). 
 22.  See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 14–15. 
 23.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 24.  See, e.g., MCCLOSKEY, supra note 8, at 25–28; WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
 25.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 26.  See, e.g., WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 31–32. 
 27.  Gerald Gunther admitted that his influential casebook was structured to make certain deci-
sions appear to be natural, while others to be exercises of judicial fiat.  See GERALD GUNTHER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975); see also David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1518–21 (2005) (de-
scribing changes to Gunther’s presentation of Lochner over time). 
 28.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
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and practices during the New Deal29 were good decisions because they were 
based on sound constitutional reasons.30  Dred Scott v. Sandford and Lochner 
v. New York31 were bad decisions because when Justices declared Congress 
could not prohibit slavery in the territories or that states could not mandate 
maximum hour laws for bakers, they substituted their political preferences 
for the legal commands of the Constitution.32  Debate occurred over why 
Brown was a legal decision and whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe 
v. Wade33 finding a right to an abortion in the Fourteenth Amendment was 
based on law or politics.34 
Rebellions within law and political science usually consisted of taking 
the perspective of the other discipline.  The critical legal studies movement 
gained notoriety by insisting, with political scientists, that all law was poli-
tics.35  A few intrepid political scientists joined the legal quest for legitimate 
modes of constitutional interpretation36 or for overcoming the countermajori-
tarian difficulty.37  Wallace Mendelson, a former clerk for Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, a long time professor of political science at the University of 
Texas, Austin, and a remarkable gentleman, was as Frankfurterian in his calls 
for judicial restraint and insistence that judicial decisions be based on rea-
soned elaboration as any former Frankfurter clerk teaching in the legal acad-
emy.38 
                                                          
 29.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 30.  See WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 23 (“The phase of our modern constitutional develop-
ment that I conceive we can most confidently deem successful inheres in the broad reading of the 
commerce, taxing, and related powers of the Congress . . . .”). 
 31.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 32.  See WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 23–24; Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 379, 381 (2011) (noting the common view that “the anticanon constitutes those decisions in 
which the Court did an especially poor job of navigating and synthesizing the[] traditional (legal) 
materials”). 
 33.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 34.  See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 947 (1973) (“[Roe] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not con-
stitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”). 
 35.  See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
 36.  See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1991); HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994). 
 37.  See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1966). 
 38.  See WALLACE MENDELSON, SUPREME COURT STATECRAFT: THE RULE OF LAW AND MEN 
(1985). 
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The Princeton school of constitutional thought,39 ably represented at 
schmoozes by Jim Fleming and Linda McClain,40 provided the main alterna-
tive during the late twentieth century to this New Deal conception of the con-
stitutional universe.  The great Walter Murphy, among others, challenged 
common claims that the federal judiciary enjoyed a monopoly on constitu-
tional authority.41  Princetonians insisted that the Constitution of the United 
States was more than the text ratified in 1789, as amended by the rules pre-
scribed in Article V.  They pushed constitutional thinkers in an Aristotelian 
direction, incorporating what they believed was the telos of constitutionalism 
and the American constitutional enterprise into constitutional theory.  Rich-
ard Albert and Yaniv Roznai are working in this tradition, exploring the pos-
sibility of unconstitutional amendments, which are constitutional amend-
ments ratified consistently with constitutional procedures that are 
nevertheless inconsistent with the basic principles underlying a constitution 
or constitutional democracy.42  Nevertheless, with the very important excep-
tion of Murphy’s last work,43 Princetonians largely accepted the legal em-
phasis of late twentieth century constitutional thinking.  The very title of the 
standard text of that school, American Constitutional Interpretation, articu-
lates the common view that American constitutional theory is about what the 
Constitution of the United States means44 and whether Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the Constitution bind all other political officials. 
II.  CRACKS IN THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE 
Prominent schmoozers and fellow travelers by the turn of the twenty-
first century were actively undermining the New Deal conceptual universe.  
Scholarship on the Constitution outside of the courts, the political construc-
tion of judicial review, and American constitutional development collapsed, 
in different ways, the distinction between law and politics.  Schmoozers did 
so when exploring institutional divisions of labor, the nature of constitutional 
                                                          
 39.  See WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986). 
 40.  See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).  For an excellent anthology of work by members of the 
Princeton school, see CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, 
MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001). 
 41.  See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional 
Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986). 
 42.  See YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS 
OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017); Richard Albert, How a Court Becomes Supreme: Defending the 
Constitution from Unconstitutional Amendments, 77 MD. L. REV. 181 (2017).  
 43.  WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A 
JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007). 
 44.  See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984). 
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decisionmaking, the justification of judicial review, constitutional authority, 
and constitutional history.  Howard Gillman and Keith Whittington called on 
public law scholars to “‘avoid continued debate over whether judicial behav-
ior is determined by “law” or “politics”’ and instead focus on the ‘interpene-
tration of law and politics and the difficulty of regarding them as either sep-
arate spheres or trying to collapse the one category into another.’”45  Some 
scholar associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, most notably 
Robert Gordon, began treating law as “relatively autonomous,” detailing how 
legal institutions were both influenced by and influenced other political in-
stitutions.46  Rogers Smith in a series of important works on the “new insti-
tutionalism” or “historical institutionalism” called on scholars to recognize 
that “legal ideologies are relatively autonomous structures with their own pe-
culiar internal character, so that they sometimes act as independent variables 
that transcend and actually help shape the content of the immediate self-in-
terest of social groups.”47 
The battle against the law/politics distinction took place on three fronts. 
Works on American constitutionalism outside of courts, often inspired by the 
Princeton School, exploded the notion that constitutional decisionmaking 
was the unique province of the judiciary.  Proponents of the political con-
struction of judicial review detailed how Supreme Court decisions were the 
consequences of elected officials empowering courts, rather than judicial ef-
forts to impose law on politics.  Students of American constitutional devel-
opment reconceived the path of American constitutionalism as a struggle be-
tween proponents of different constitutional visions, rather than as contests 
between law and politics. 
The schmooze critique of the law/politics distinction often leans on what 
might be described as a comparative “veer” in constitutional scholarship.  
The scholars responsible for the New Deal conceptual universe wrote almost 
exclusively on the constitutional law of the United States, often identifying 
the particular elements of American constitutional democracy with the nec-
essary elements of any constitutional democracy.  Wechsler, for example, 
                                                          
 45.   Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal 
Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 494 (2001) (quoting Keith E. 
Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 629–31 (2000); see Howard Gillman, From Fundamental Law to Con-
stitutional Politics—and Back, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 185–86 (1998) (noting the contribu-
tions Judith Shklar and Stephen Griffin made to the collapse of the law/politics distinction”). 
 46.  Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). 
 47.  Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the ‘New Institutionalism,’ and the Future of 
Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 82, 98 (1988); see Rogers M. Smith, If Politics Matters: Impli-
cations for a ‘New Institutionalism’, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 3–4 (1992). 
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spoke about the role of law and politics in general, never hinting that a con-
stitutional democracy might organize institutional functions differently than 
the United States.48  The Constitution of the United States still occupies the 
place of pride among students of the Constitution outside of the courts, the 
political construction of judicial review, and constitutional development.  
Nevertheless, some prominent schmoozers write primarily on comparative 
constitutionalism.49  Others have published major works on comparative con-
stitutionalism.50  Most do little more than dabble on constitutional matters 
outside of the United States,51 but almost all schmoozers are far more aware 
of, and are more likely to take into account the work of, at least a few com-
parative constitutionalism scholars than were members of the previous gen-
eration of constitutional scholars in the United States. 
The Princeton School laid the foundation for challenging the New Deal 
conceptual universe by questioning the judicial monopoly on constitutional 
interpretation and authority, pointing to a long tradition in American politics 
of prominent presidents, most notably Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, 
Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, who raised questions about the ju-
dicial power to determine for the entire regime what constitutional provisions 
mean.52  Sanford Levinson’s Constitutional Faith pushed the envelope fur-
ther.  Levinson identified a “Protestant” strand in American constitutional-
ism, one in which all Americans, from Supreme Court Justices to ordinary 
citizens, engaged in independent constitutional interpretation. Rather than 
                                                          
 48.  See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 14–20. 
 49.  See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009); LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY 
AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007); RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE 
RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014); GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010); DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, HIGH COURTS AND ECONOMIC 
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discuss how constitutional authorities should interpret the Constitution, Lev-
inson’s volume meditated on why and whether one should be faithful to the 
Constitution.  By shifting the focus of American constitutional thought, Lev-
inson highlighted important constitutional questions that only tangentially 
concerned Supreme Court Justices, such as what immigrants (or Presidents) 
affirmed when they promised to be faithful (or loyal) to the Constitution.53  
Keith Whittington’s Constitutional Construction further elaborated on Amer-
ican constitutionalism outside of the courts by detailing numerous constitu-
tional debates, such as the debates over protective tariffs and standards for 
impeaching presidents, that took place without substantial or any judicial in-
put.54  Whittington insisted that elected officials appropriately rely on differ-
ent justificatory constitutional logics than elected officials.  Elected officials 
construe the Constitution, relying on sources external to the text when resolv-
ing constitutional ambiguities and silences.  Justices interpret the Constitu-
tion, limiting their inquiries to matters entirely within the text.55 
Other scholars recognized that participants in political movements are 
constitutional actors with constitutional agendas.  Jack Balkin and Reva 
Siegel investigated the influence of social movements on First Amendment 
and equal protection law.  They concluded that “[w]hen movements succeed 
in contesting the application of constitutional principles, they can help 
change the social meaning of constitutional principles and the practices they 
regulate.”56  Bruce Ackerman detailed how Martin Luther King, Jr. and the 
civil rights movement, Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, and 
Lyndon Johnson and the Congress of the United States were equal partici-
pants in the process that made Brown v. Board of Education the central pillar 
of contemporary American constitutionalism.57  Mariah Zeisberg used Fred-
erick Douglass as a case study when she examined the distinctive processes 
by which American citizens engage in constitutional exegesis.  “The work of 
citizens,” she wrote, should “be not to represent the positions of others but 
rather to generate public conceptions of the document that are more praise-
worthy, from a justice point of view, than the conceptions that they re-
ceived.”58  An important strain in the literature on the Constitution outside of 
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the courts developed new histories of twentieth century constitutional liber-
alism.  Laura Weinrib, Risa Goluboff, and George Lovell detailed the differ-
ent conceptions of free speech, racial equality, and civil liberties that lawyers 
and ordinary citizens articulated during the first half of the twentieth century, 
as well as the constitutional politics inside, but mostly outside, the courts that 
tamed more radical interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.59  William Forbath is documenting a “social citizenship tradition,” 
which “centered on decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a 
measure of economic independence and democracy.” 60  Proponents of social 
citizenship created a “majoritarian tradition, addressing [their] arguments to 
lawmakers and citizens, not to courts.”61 
Contemporary works on the Constitution outside of the courts highlight 
how the Constitution on the ground looks far different from that proffered by 
the New Deal conceptual universe that saw only the Constitution inside the 
courts.  Gerald Rosenberg famously concluded that the law in action on such 
matters as race and abortion often did not even bear a family resemblance to 
the official constitutional law of the land.62  Scholars who disagreed with 
Rosenberg’s conclusion that litigation was a poor means for seeking consti-
tutional change nevertheless recognized that judicial decisions rarely, if ever, 
reconfigure the constitutional universe in their own image.63  In many cir-
cumstances, constitutional development occurs when the Supreme Court is 
offstage.  Steven Griffin’s Long Wars and the Constitution documents the 
fundamental changes in the constitutional balance of powers between the 
President and Congress over foreign policy that have taken place over the last 
seventy years, despite the absence of any Supreme Court decision on such 
matters as the constitutional authority of the President to order military action 
overseas without congressional approval.64  Constitutional rules have a dif-
ferent structure when we evaluate the interactions between the elected 
branches of government.  Mariah Zeisberg’s War Powers suggests that what 
matters in a separation of powers analysis is that each elected branch of gov-
ernment brings its distinctive virtues to bear on a national problem.  She 
maintains that constitutional processes should not be strangled by the fixed 
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legal rules better suited to regulating such matters as when Congress may 
regulate free speech than such matters as when Congress may delegate power 
to the president.65 
A related strand of analysis, best described as “American constitution-
alism outside the federal courts,” by adding state constitutions and state 
courts into the mix, demonstrates far greater diversity in the American con-
stitutional experience than that captured by a conceptual universe limited to 
studying the Supreme Court of the United States.  Levinson, in Framed: 
America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Government, observes that 
many truisms of American constitutionalism are truisms only with respect to 
federal constitutions.  State constitutions, he points out, change frequently, 
routinely require judicial elections, and often elect different members of the 
executive branch separately.  None of these deviations have led to the unto-
ward consequences predicted by an inherited constitutional theory that treats 
the Constitution of the United States as the sole expression of American con-
stitutional thought and touchstone for best constitutional practices.66  Emily 
Zackin points out how American state constitutions routinely include positive 
rights, such as rights to certain public services, that are absent from the Con-
stitution of the United States.  She argues that “Americans have a long tradi-
tion of enshrining positive rights in constitutions, but that we must look at 
state constitutional politics to find them.”67  Zackin and Mila Versteeg high-
light how state constitutions, like those of other democracies, are far more 
detailed and far more likely to be either replaced or amended.68  John Dinan 
maintains that state officials are often more protective of constitutional rights 
than judges.69  He describes the hundreds of state constitutional conventions 
held over the past two-hundred years that have served as vehicles for incor-
porating new visions of governance into fundamental law.70 
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Scholarship documenting the political construction of judicial power in-
tegrated constitutional developments inside and outside the courts.  Howard 
Gillman, Keith Whittington, Paul Frymer, George Lovell, and many others 
relate how constitutional actors outside of courts have consistently sought to 
empower the federal judiciary in order to secure their constitutional ambi-
tions.71  Gillman describes how the Judiciary Acts of 1875 and 1891 helped 
fashion a Republican controlled judiciary that declared unconstitutional state 
interferences with national markets and sharply restricted the power of labor 
unions.72  Frymer discusses how the Democratic Party, during the 1960s, 
foisted on to courts disputes over the racial integration of unions that badly 
divided two crucial members of that coalition, both union members of color.73  
Lovell writes about how Congress during the early twentieth century empow-
ered courts to make antitrust law and determine the legal status of labor un-
ions through vague statutory language that invited judges to make public pol-
icy in the guise of statutory interpretation.74  Whittington details how 
Presidents routinely endorse judicial supremacy when confronted with a hos-
tile or paralyzed legislature.75 
Judicial review is as politically constructed in other constitutional de-
mocracies.  Nadiv Mordechay and Yaniv Roznai observe that elected official 
may facilitate judicial authority by inaction as well as action.  They state, 
“[T]he anti-majoritarian judicial defense of rights and freedoms was estab-
lished in Israel through a tacit political consent.  For various reasons the Basic 
Laws on Human Rights have not been repealed, and the Knesset, in fact, ac-
cepted the idea that it has constitutional limits . . . .”76 
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Courts in constitutional politics neither steal issues from election offi-
cials nor serve as mere agents for dominant majorities, but are one of many 
sites for political contests over what constitutional visions shall be the official 
law of the land.  Ran Hirschl’s hegemonic preservation thesis maintains that 
coalitions that fear losing their grip of electoral power, from the Federalists 
in 1800 to the Labor Party in Israel at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
often seek to empower judiciaries in order to maintain their influence over 
political and constitutional affairs.  “[W]hen their policy preferences have 
been, or are likely to be, increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-
making arenas,” Hirschl asserts, “elites that possess disproportionate access 
to, and influence over, the legal arena may initiate a constitutional entrench-
ment of rights and judicial review in order to transfer power to supreme 
courts.”77 
Judicial empowerment may fail or be partly successful.  Mordechay and 
Roznai note that the democratic project of the Israeli Supreme Court has not 
fully come to fruition because of an inadequate underlying constitutional pol-
itics.  The justices and their allies have incompletely liberalized Israeli con-
stitutional politics because “the supervisory capacity of the parliament” was 
not fully developed and “the constitutional ethos in the public sphere” was 
not “strengthen[ed].”78  Powerful courts are relatively, but not completely 
autonomous institutions.  Tom Keck points out that American Justices in a 
wide variety of cases cannot be classified as acting purely as umpires who 
put law over politics, purely as tyrants who impose their policy preferences 
on the body public, or purely as sideshows who blindly incorporate the dom-
inant party’s preferences into law.79 
Scholarship on the political construction of judicial review subverts the 
law/politics distinction that structured the New Deal conceptual universe.  Ju-
dicial power to declare laws unconstitutional does not present a counterma-
joritarian difficulty when that authority is established by legislative acts, such 
as the Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly authorized federal courts to 
strike down federal and state legislation,80 rather than judicial decisions, such 
as Marbury v. Madison.81  The generation of scholars who worried about the 
democratic status of such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education, as Kevin 
McMahon details, wasted a good fuss.  The foundations of that ruling were 
laid as much by decisions made by the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower 
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administrations to staff the federal courts with racial liberals as by the series 
of judicial decisions that undermined Plessy v. Ferguson82 and Jim Crow in 
public education.83  Barry Friedman’s five-part history of the countermajori-
tarian difficulty insisted that public concern with the democratic credentials 
of judicial power throughout American history varies with the constitutional 
politics of particular eras and is not a constant feature of the American con-
stitutional regime.84  Friedman identified the following:  
[F]our factors that explain from a historical perspective when 
countermajoritarian criticism of the courts is likely to emerge.…  
(a) the extent to which judicial decisions are unpopular with a 
group substantial enough to be able to claim to speak for “the peo-
ple”; (b) whether such decisions are rendered at a time when public 
sentiment favors a relatively popular or direct form of democracy; 
(c) whether at the time such decisions are rendered there is relative 
faith in the determinacy of judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion; and (d) whether such decisions are rendered during a period 
of judicial supremacy.85 
Proponents of the political construction of judicial power explore why 
elected officials empower courts rather than the conditions under which 
courts may thwart the will of elected officials.  Levinson and Balkin see 
courts as sites for partisan entrenchment.  “Parties who control the presidency 
install jurists of their liking,” they declare, who “in turn create decisions 
which are embodied in constitutional doctrine and continue to have influence 
long after those who nominated and confirmed the jurists have left office.”86  
Ginsburg maintains that politicians drafting a constitutionally constructed ju-
dicial review is a form of political insurance.87  Justin Crowe’s history of the 
federal legislation that first created, and then expanded, the federal judiciary 
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finds that elected officials throughout American history actively sought pow-
erful courts partly to secure certain policy goals, partly to satisfy certain pat-
ronage needs, and partly because of commitments to a well-functioning and 
partly independent judicial system.88 
Politically constructed judicial power presents challenges to constitu-
tional democracy that the countermajoritarian difficulty does not capture.  
George Lovell and Scott Lemieux worry that judicial review may enable 
elected officials to hide their responsibility for contested judicial decisions.89  
Gordon Silverstein worries that judicial review may result in incoherent pol-
icy, as for example, when the Justices in Buckley v. Valeo90 declared uncon-
stitutional parts, but not all, of a federal campaign spending law that Congress 
designed to be a coherent whole.91  Another strand of this scholarship treats 
judicial review as one of the many veto points that exist in American consti-
tutional politics.  Lemieux and David Watkins insist that politically con-
structed judicial review serves the democratic goal of preventing domination 
better than other veto points, such as the filibuster.  Acknowledging the 
“complicated relationship between constitutional courts and other political 
actors,” they conclude, “judicial review is a relatively attractive veto point 
from a democracy-against-domination standpoint.”92 
Students of American constitutional development opened up another 
front in the war against the law/politics distinction by finding more fruitful 
ways of looking at constitutional history than distinguishing bad political de-
cisions from good legal decisions.93  Rogers Smith’s seminal Liberalism and 
American Constitutional Law explored how American constitutional law 
could be understood as contests over different ways of working out a liberal 
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tradition.94  Over time, Smith concluded that much of American constitu-
tional development was a struggle between, as well as a complex amalgam 
of, liberal, republican, and ascriptive traditions, the latter of which regarded 
American identity as rooted in certain characteristics, such as race, that are 
established at birth.95  Rather than classify judicial decisions by the extent to 
which they were rooted in political will or legal logic, Smith classified judi-
cial decisions in light of their affinity with different strands of the American 
constitutional tradition.  Howard Gillman documented how the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, often regarded as the poster-child 
for political decisionmaking, was rooted in jurisprudential traditions that 
dated from the founding.  All the Justices on the Lochner Court, he explained, 
engaged in making law because they were committed to elaborating the con-
stitutional text in light of past precedents and longstanding traditions.  All the 
Justices on the Lochner Court were also engaged in politics because how they 
interpreted the constitutional text in light of past precedents and longstanding 
traditions depended on their idiosyncratic values and policy preferences.96 
American constitutional development, as works in the schmooze tradi-
tion elaborate, is a consequence of complex dialogues between courts, elected 
officials, and non-governmental political actors, rather than the study of ju-
dicial solos.  Eric Lomazoff’s forthcoming book on the constitutional status 
of the national bank in the early republic details how McCulloch was partly 
the product of changing federal and state banking practices, partly the product 
of the changing constitutional understandings of the National Republican ma-
jority in Congress, and partly the product of longstanding Marshall Court in-
terpretations of federal powers.97  John Compton documents how nineteenth 
century evangelical movements, while seeking to ban lotteries and prohibit 
drinking, provided the constitutional foundations for the New Deal state.98  
Kenneth Kersch explores how the constitutional meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment changed as the conventional subject of a contested search 
evolved from businesspersons to bootleggers to persons of color.99  In many 
                                                          
 94.  See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 
1990). 
 95.  See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY (1997). 
 96.  See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 97.  ERIC LOMAZOFF, A TALE OF TWO CLAUSES: RECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS OF NATIONAL BANKING, 1791–1832 (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (on file with 
author). 
 98.  See JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(2014). 
 99.  See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129–133 (2004). 
 2017] THE SCHMOOZE PROJECT 127 
 
instances, what Ronald Kahn describes as a “mutual construction process” 
exists, whereby political developments influence how federal justices inter-
pret the constitutional universe, and those interpretations, in turn, reshape the 
rest of American politics.100  Pamela Brandwein considers how Demo-
cratic/conservative Republican understandings of Reconstruction, inside and 
outside of the federal judiciary, influenced what materials later scholars 
thought relevant to determining the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which in turn influenced how the Supreme Court interpreted 
that text.  Her work describes the “impact . . . on Warren Court arguments 
about legislative apportionment” of “history’s production—as built mostly 
by Northern Democratic congressmen in 1866, reconstituted by the Supreme 
Court in the 1870s, and validated by [the legal historian] Charles Fairman in 
the 1950s.”101 
These new constitutional histories collapse the law/politics distinction 
underlying Herbert Wechsler’s call for judicial decisions based on neutral 
principles, as well as the attitudinal model’s claim that Justices make deci-
sions on the basis of policy preferences rather than on the legal basis of the 
law.  Smith’s analysis of the impact of liberalism, republicanism, and ascrip-
tivism on American constitutional development highlights how political and 
legal variables are inevitably intertwined in legal decisions in ways that can-
not be neatly disentangled.  Inherited political science models, as I have 
pointed out, have difficulty classifying judicial decisions to follow past legal 
precedents, such as the judicial decision in Ex parte McCardle,102 when those 
precedents were initially based on strategic or policy considerations.  “The 
legal roads” to most decisions, that work concludes, are “paved by a legal, 
strategic, and attitudinal mixture,” no element of which “can easily be iso-
lated.”103 
Schmoozers, nevertheless, treat courts as distinctive political institu-
tions, not distinct from the rest of a homogenized political universe, but dis-
tinctive in the sense that the Federal Elections Commission, Republican 
Party, and Des Moines School Board are also distinctive political institutions.  
As Carol Nackenoff notes in a contribution to a past schmooze, “The Court 
has its own norms, dynamics, and institutional history; it has doctrine, rules, 
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precedents, metaphors, and language peculiar to it.”104  Some studies in 
American constitutional development highlight how law slows the imple-
mentation of policy preferences.  Elizabeth Bussiere details how Warren 
Court Justices, committed to greater economic equality, did not have the legal 
time necessary to establish the precedents that might have eventually led to 
decisions declaring constitutional rights to basic necessities.105  Julie Novkov 
explains how Supreme Court decisions in the 1930s that freed legislatures to 
regulate the bargaining process between employers and employees106 pro-
vided doctrinal foundations for judicial decisions restricting women in the 
economic marketplace107 long after the progressive justifications for those 
restrictions had vanished.  “Protection was won at the expense of the recog-
nition of women’s full citizenship,” she asserts, and was maintained “long 
after it was a valuable tool for women.”108   
Legal institutions influence how policy preferences are formed and im-
plemented.  Life tenure and legality matter.  Tom Keck demonstrates that 
Republican and Democratic judicial appointees on the federal bench vote dif-
ferently than their political sponsors in the White House and Congress.109  
Leslie Goldstein’s exhaustive study of American racial politics concludes 
that Justices are more likely than elected officials to protect the rights of ra-
cial minorities.  She writes, “[T]he Court has, within the strictures created by 
the Constitution, acted to protect rights of one or another racial minority 
group to a greater degree than the elected branches have been willing to 
do.”110 
III.  TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
These schmooze projects are united by a commitment to constitutional 
politics rather than the separation between law and politics.  Constitutional-
ism, in a conceptual universe developed by schmoozers, is a system of gov-
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ernance that integrates law and politics.  Matters conventionally deemed pol-
itics influence the course of American constitutionalism.  Likewise, matters 
conventionally deemed legal influence the course of partisan politics.  Good 
constitutional orders foster appropriate interactions between law and politics 
and do not construct impenetrable barriers between the two. 
The path of constitutional law frequently intersects with the path of par-
tisan politics, even though the two roads do not run fully parallel to each 
other.  Both the Taney and Chase Courts reflected the Jacksonian proclivities 
of the Supreme Court Justices appointed between 1828 and 1860.111  During 
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, when competition between two 
non-ideological parties structured American politics, Supreme Court deci-
sion making was generally consistent with the views of a bipartisan elite.112  
Howard Gillman, Susan Lawrence, and Charles Epp point out how the liber-
alism of the Warren Court was partly rooted in congressional decisions that 
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal court system and provided substantial 
support for liberal litigation campaigns.113  Eliminate congressional funding 
for the Legal Services Corporation, and such cases as Goldberg v. Kelly,114 
which provided a hearing for welfare recipients before government officials 
could terminate their benefits, probably would not come before the Supreme 
Court. 
Basic features of American politics reflect underlying constitutional 
structures and decisions.  Candidates for the presidency camp out in a few 
swing states, ignoring large metropolitan areas, such as New York City, Chi-
cago, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., because the Electoral College 
awards victories based on gaining the most votes in individual states rather 
than gaining the most votes throughout the United States.115  Change the con-
stitutional rules for electing the president, and how candidates conduct elec-
toral campaigns will change.  Lisa Miller’s recent The Myth of Mob Rule: 
Violent Crime & Democratic Politics details how the policies that explain 
                                                          
 111.  See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 77–93 (5th ed. rev. 2008); Mark 
A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 17 (2000). 
 112.  See Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conflict, 50 IND. 
L. REV. 141, 160–67 (2016). 
 113.  See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE 
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990); HOWARD 
GILLMAN, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Ac-
tivism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 103, at 
138. 
 114.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 115.  See Two-Thirds of Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE (last 
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different imprisonment rates among countries are highly sensitive to the 
structure of constitutional institutions.  Parliamentary systems, she details, 
tend to be more concerned with prevention.  In contrast, the American presi-
dential system generates more concern with punishment.116  The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke117 and 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber118 help explain why Fortune 500 
companies became more committed to diversity during the last decades of 
the twentieth century, which, in turn, helps explain why the Supreme Court 
in Grutter v. Bollinger119 reaffirmed Bakke’s support for using race in uni-
versity admissions processes.120 
Constitutional politics are dynamic.  Struggles take place across the po-
litical universe over the language for discussing fundamental regime com-
mitments, the places where such commitments may be discussed, the institu-
tions with the authority to at least temporarily settle constitutional 
controversies, and persons who occupy privileged positions in those institu-
tions.  Chief Justice John Marshall captured an important truth when he as-
serted that the Constitution of the United States was “intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”121 He nevertheless failed to acknowledge or foresee the deeply par-
tisan processes by which those formal, semi-formal, and informal constitu-
tional changes occur.122 
Constitutions in the schmooze world view are devices that constitute 
politics rather than means for regulating politics from above.  Constitutions 
create languages for talking about fundamental regime commitments.123  
Americans debate whether the death penalty is “cruel and unusual punish-
ment[]”124 and whether requiring persons to buy health insurance “regulate[s] 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”125  Constitutions create places for 
discussing and settling fundamental political commitments.  The First 
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Amendment gives all citizens the right to petition the national government 
on constitutional and other matters.126  Article III creates a judiciary with ju-
risdiction over “all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution.”127  Constitu-
tions grant some people privileged positions in constitutional controversies: 
Federal Justices adjudicate cases raising constitutional matters.  Presidents 
have the power to veto laws they believe unconstitutional. 
Constitutional politics consistently alters the language for discussing 
fundamental regime commitments.  Political movements have not struggled 
to change the literal constitutional text.  Republicans in 1868 successfully 
added a textual commitment to equality that changed how Americans dis-
cussed the rights of persons of color and the rights of business corpora-
tions.128  The women’s suffrage movement successfully added a textual right 
to vote that changed how Americans debated whether women could serve on 
juries.129  And political movements influence constitutional conversations 
even when they do not change the constitutional text.  When Americans in 
the twenty-first century debate the constitutional meaning of racial equality, 
they often spend more energy discussing the meaning of Brown v. Board of 
Education than the meaning of the post-Civil War Amendments.130  Jamal 
Greene details the exceptional influence of the marketing campaign devoted 
to selling originalism as the primary means for constitutional interpreta-
tion.131 
Similar struggles between political actors and political movements take 
place over what places shall have a privileged position in the constitutional 
order and who shall occupy those places.  Much of constitutional politics 
consists of partisan efforts to empower those institutions that particular po-
litical movements believe they are most likely to control or influence for the 
foreseeable future.  Antebellum southerners fought for state rights on matters 
they believed that states would make pro-slavery policies and for national 
power on matters they believed the national government more likely to make 
pro-slavery policies.132  “A broad generalization, inaccurate only at the mar-
gins,” Mark Tushnet maintains, 
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is that nearly every constitutional theorist urges minimal judicial 
review and vigorous democratic dialogue on issues on which the 
theorist believes her preferred position is likely to prevail in the 
democratic dialogue and more-than-minimal review on issues on 
which the theorist believes her preferred position is unlikely to pre-
vail there.133 
Whittington details how presidents promote judicial supremacy when 
they believe that the federal judiciary is more sympathetic to their constitu-
tional vision than Congress.134  Political actors and movements as aggres-
sively seek to change the persons who occupy the privileged positions in the 
American constitutional universe.  Presidential candidates routinely tout their 
pro-life or pro-choice credentials.  When elected, they appoint Justices and 
other government officials who broadly share their commitment to making a 
particular constitutional vision the official law of the land. 
Participants in constitutional politics have multiple identities.  The New 
Deal conceptual universe divided political actors into judges and elected of-
ficials.135  This obsession with institutional affiliation discounted how parti-
san commitments, policy preferences, and personal identities exercise inde-
pendent influence on constitutional behavior.  That Ruth Bader Ginsburg is 
a Supreme Court Justice, a proponent of gender equality, a Democrat, and a 
white, Jewish woman all help explain why she favors judicial supremacy,136 
insists on a high degree of scrutiny for gender classifications,137 opposes 
Christian prayers to open public meetings,138 and is unlikely to retire while 
Donald Trump is President.  A complete explanation of Donald Trump’s con-
stitutional actions, in turn, requires taking into account that he was the suc-
cessful Republican candidate for the presidency, that he is a businessperson 
with an affinity for the alt-Right, and that Trump is a white male with limited 
religious convictions.139 
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IV.  FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO THE WORKING 
CONSTITUTION 
Constitutional politics studies how constitutions work rather than what 
constitutional provisions mean.  Schmoozers explore what people are doing 
or trying to do when they alter constitutional language, make constitutional 
arguments, and engage in numerous other forms of constitutional politics.  
Constitutional interpretation is central to these enterprises.  Constitutional 
designers declare that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion,”140 or “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,”141 because they believe those texts have 
particular meanings.  How constitutional authorities interpret the words “nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”142 determines whether certain crim-
inals are executed for their crimes.  Nevertheless, constitutional framers rec-
ognize that parchment barriers are insufficient to fashion a constitutional or-
der.143  The persons responsible for creating, maintaining and modifying 
constitutions are constructing entire regimes, not merely limiting govern-
ment. 
Constitutional framers when creating regimes perform various tasks.  
Framers design institutions that foster constitutional fidelity.  What the fram-
ers were doing when they mandated life tenure for members of the federal 
judiciary, Federalist 78 claims, was facilitating the appointment of persons 
with “sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the station of judges.”144  
Many constitutional purposes cannot be achieved solely by words.  A clause 
that forbade the president from appointing major generals whose “military 
knowledge, though plucky and adventury, has only been brought down to the 
beginning of the century”145 is likely to be ineffective unless the President 
has the capacity and will to appoint competent military commanders.  What 
the framers were doing when designing the system for electing the President, 
Federalist 68 points out, was increasing the “probability of seeing the station 
filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.”146  Rather than pro-
vide fixed limits on government, constitutional framers may be more con-
cerned to guarantee, to the extent humanly possible, that persons with certain 
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capacities, values, and interests are responsible for implementing particular 
constitutional provisions.  What Thaddeus Stevens was doing when he fought 
for the Fourteenth Amendment was “secur[ing] [the] perpetual ascendancy 
[of] the party of the Union [i.e., the Republican Party]” as the coalition that 
would be responsible for protecting the rights and exercising the powers enu-
merated by the Thirteenth Amendment.147 
The successors to constitutional framers perform similar tasks.  They 
must ensure that institutions under changing circumstances continue to foster 
constitutional fidelity, generate leaders with the capacity to make intelligent 
policy, and privilege government by persons who represent the right combi-
nation of capacities, values and interests to achieve vital constitutional com-
mitments.  What Democrats in the Jacksonian Era were doing when they 
adopted supermajority rules for selecting the party’s nominee for the presi-
dency was ensuring the selection of persons sensitive to slaveholding inter-
ests.148  What Congress was doing during the Great Society by attaching var-
ious legislative vetoes to legislation delegating power was trying to retain 
some control over executive and administrative policymaking.149 
Constitutions work by constraining politics, constructing politics, and 
constituting politics.150  Constitutions constrain politics when citizens, 
elected officials and Justices do not champion what they would otherwise 
believe are desirable policies because they believe those policies are uncon-
stitutional or because the Supreme Court has declared those policies uncon-
stitutional.  James Madison vetoed a roads and canals bill he thought effica-
cious because he thought the federal government was not constitutionally 
authorized to sponsor internal improvements.151  Justice Felix Frankfurter re-
fused to declare unconstitutional policies that violated his core commitments 
to free speech.152 
Constitutions construct politics by aggregating interests, values, and 
policy preferences in ways that privilege certain outcomes.  State equality in 
the Senate helps explain why Wyoming gets a higher share of transit funds 
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(and anti-terrorist funds) per capita than New York.153  The American politi-
cal system polarized during the 1850s and is polarized at present in part be-
cause the Constitution mandates an electoral system in which all members of 
the national legislature are chosen in local elections.154  Americans who be-
lieve that abortion should be legal, but heavily regulated, may occupy the 
political center nationally, but they are in the minority in both Utah and Mas-
sachusetts, and states are where Americans hold elections for national office. 
Constitutions constitute politics by shaping values.  Madison thought 
that constitutional rights functioned by educating public opinion as well as 
by constraining political action.  He told the first Congress that the parchment 
declarations in a bill of rights would have “a tendency to impress some degree 
of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse 
the attention of the whole community.”155  Americans favor presidential sys-
tems primarily because they are socialized to appreciate the merits of presi-
dential systems.  When white supremacists seek permits to hold rallies, 
Americans have been conditioned to ask whether the First Amendment pro-
tects hate speech.  Persons raised in a different constitutional order think 
some other question better frames the relevant issues.156 
Students of constitutional politics are especially concerned with the con-
ditions under which constitutional democracy works and the conditions under 
which constitutional democracy might work better.  By looking at how an 
entire regime generates and realizes particular constitutional visions, 
schmoozers go beyond the New Deal obsession with an independent judici-
ary that declares laws unconstitutional as the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a good constitutional order.  Stephen Griffin’s essay in this sympo-
sium examines such elements of a constitutional order as “the structure of 
state institutions, political parties trying to run the Constitution in a polarized 
environment, the technological elites who staff the state, and the political 
trust required to keep the rickety train of government on track.”157  Stephen 
Elkin provides a better framework for both empirical and normative work 
when observing that a constitutional order consists of commitments to certain 
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values, institutions designed to achieve those values, and a people who share 
a commitment to those values and are capable of operating the relevant insti-
tutions.158  Constitutions work when the relevant values, institutions and peo-
ple align.  Constitutional crises, “constitutional retrogression,”159 or what 
Jack Balkin calls “constitutional rot” occur when the constitutional order be-
comes “disharmonic.”160  One dimension of the constitutional order conflicts 
with or undermines other dimensions.  During the years before the Civil War, 
governing institutions designed to facilitate compromises among sections in-
creasingly privileged the election of sectional extremists.161  Immediately af-
ter the Civil War, constitutional commitments to racial equality conflicted 
with increased elite commitments to federalism and scientific racism.162 
The Federalist Papers outlines at length some broader constitutional 
phenomena necessary for maintaining a constitutional republic.  James Mad-
ison and Alexander Hamilton were particularly concerned with the character 
of the political leadership class.  They celebrated the institutions established 
by the Constitution of the United States for their capacity to generate govern-
ing officials who were committed to constitutional values, had the capacity 
to pursue such constitutional goals as the general welfare and common de-
fense, and were sufficiently diverse to represent the entire country.  Federal-
ist 57 declares that every political constitution should strive above all “to ob-
tain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to 
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to 
hold their public trust.”163  Federalist 10, as opposed to Federalist 2,164 em-
phasizes that constitutional democracy can thrive only in a diverse society.  
Madison wrote, “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of par-
ties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will 
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”165 
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The great democratic theorist Robert Dahl, updating Publius, concluded 
that stable polyarchies, of which constitutional democracies are an important 
subset, require “modern[,] dynamic pluralist societ[ies].”166  These societies 
are characterized by 
a relatively high level of income and wealth per capita, long-run 
growth in per capita income and wealth, a high level of urbaniza-
tion, a rapidly declining or relatively small agricultural population, 
great occupational diversity, extensive literacy, a comparatively 
large number of persons who have attended institutions of higher 
education, an economic order in which production is mainly car-
ried on by relatively autonomous firms whose decisions are 
strongly oriented toward national and international markets, and 
relatively high levels of conventional indicators of well-being, 
such as physicians and hospital beds per thousand persons, life ex-
pectancy, infant mortality, percentage of families with various con-
sumer durables, and so on.167 
Modernity, dynamism, and pluralism each play distinctive roles foster-
ing polyarchy and constitutional democracy.  Modern societies are governed 
by highly educated officials whose decisions are consistently evaluated by a 
literate public.  Dynamic societies are characterized by a strong and confident 
middle-class whose members, during most economic times, enjoy secure jobs 
and livelihoods.168  Pluralist societies are populated by citizens who have a 
wide variety of economic, religious, ethnic and other identities, and these 
identities are considered consistent with their full citizenship in the regime.169  
Dahl concludes that this combination of modernity, dynamism and pluralism 
creates political environments in which political actors “can resist unilateral 
domination, compete with each other for advantages, engage in conflict and 
bargaining, and pursue independent actions on their own.”170  Though re-
gimes commonly considered to be constitutional democracies are often char-
acterized by substantial inequalities and political exclusions.171 
An admittedly creative synthesis of Publius, Dahl and various schmooz-
ers suggest four conditions under which democratic constitutions are likely 
to work. 
 An intelligent and experienced leadership class that is committed to 
the basic norms of constitutional democracy and engages in politics 
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for the purpose of serving the public rather than for celebrity or en-
richment. 
 A population that takes what the eighteenth century thought of as a 
scientific outlook on public policy, rather than making political 
choices on ideological or religious dogma.  Politics is experienced 
rather than faith based.  The ways in which citizens acquire infor-
mation exposes them to various perspectives and facilitates intelli-
gent political decisions. 
 A commitment to social pluralism.  Political actors recognize that 
multiple ways exist of leading the good life, being a good citizen, 
and constructing a good society.172  People are encouraged to have a 
wide variety of identities consistent with condition 2 and persons 
with those identities are fairly represented in the political elite.  Pol-
iticians committed to pluralism are able to reach the broadly accepted 
compromises necessary to maintain a stable political order. 
 A commitment to a fair degree of economic and social equality.  Sub-
stantial class mobility exists.  No social or economic class, the polit-
ical class in particular, is walled off from good or bad times.  No 
underclass exists that is disproportionately composed of members of 
identifiable groups in the population. 
Variations on these themes are certainly possible.  Nevertheless, the 
turns from the law/politics distinction to constitutional politics and from con-
stitutional interpretation to the working constitution focus constitutional the-
ory far more on the composition of the political class, the nature of deci-
sionmaking, the acceptance of social and cultural pluralism, and the roles of 
social and economic class in a particular regime than on whether constitu-
tional courts are correctly interpreting the constitutional text.173 
V.  THE CRISIS OF (AMERICAN) CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
The present governing crisis in the United States and throughout the 
world, the schmooze project suggests, is a consequence of a weakening in 
these conditions for constitutional democracy.  Griffin notes that “constitu-
tional crises [are] generated internally rather than externally,”174 by failures 
of constitutional institutions operating normally to achieve desirable results 
rather than by unexpected outside shocks to the political system.  Independent 
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judiciaries remain in place, but their foundations and the foundations for 
more vital conditions of constitutional democracy are crumbling.  Elections 
are held regularly and laws passed according to the constitutional rules, but 
the “policy disasters that have occurred in recent years, including the Iraq 
War and the 2008 financial crisis, suggest that something is deeply wrong 
with the way the American state is organized.”175  Some prominent schmooz-
ers look for solutions outside of constitutional politics, calling for a constitu-
tional convention that will somehow happen without the intervention of Con-
gress, political parties or existing political interests.176  The schmooze project 
provides reasons for thinking this project both intellectually stimulating and 
an escapist fantasy.  While citizens in a healthy constitutional democracy 
consistently ask whether constitutional institutions might be improved, prob-
lems within existing constitutional politics can be cured only by effective use 
of resources within existing constitutional politics.177 
The institutions and practices of constitutional democracy are weaken-
ing throughout the world, as well as in the United States.  Yasmin Dawood’s 
contribution to this symposium asserts that “democracy [is] in retreat across 
nearly the entire globe.”178  Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg observe an “incre-
mental (but ultimately substantial) decay in three basic predicates of democ-
racy—competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the 
adjudicative and administrative rule of law necessary for democratic choice 
to thrive.”179  Both fragile and previously stable constitutional democracies 
are under siege.  Huq and Ginsburg observe “constitutional backsliding” in 
Venezuela, Thailand, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Hungary and Poland.180  Mordechay 
and Roznai document the decline of democratic commitments in Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s Israel, noting “an erosion of [Israel’s] democratic institutions” 
leading “to an incremental democratic backslide.”181 
Citizens of constitutional democracies are increasingly likely to be gov-
erned by officials who fail to satisfy Publian, Dahlian or related standards for 
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constitutional leadership.  The President of the United States is a bigot182 who 
lacks every qualification for the presidency set out in the Federalist Papers, 
save for being elected according to the rules set out in Article II.183  Many 
Republicans and Democrats treat electoral politics as a path for enrichment 
and celebrity rather than as a means for facilitating human flourishing.184  
President Trump’s response to political protest, state legislation aimed at po-
litical protest, and legislation designed to reduce voting by less fortunate 
Americans highlights weakening support for the practices of constitutional 
democracy across the American constitutional universe.185  Leaders with a 
similar absence of qualifications and democratic commitments are gaining 
traction in electoral politics in other constitutional democracies.186 
At a time when knowledge about matters as diverse as global warming, 
globalization, and nuclear proliferation is particularly vital,187 substantial per-
centages of the voting population in the United States do not know basic facts 
about the environment, the economy, and foreign policy.188  An influential 
minority of Americans, often inspired by political or business entrepreneurs, 
are particularly prone to engage in magical thinking when discounting the 
scientific consensus on global warming.189  Chinn notes that “the polity is 
bereft of the basic tools needed for . . . engagement” on vital political ques-
tions, such as “agreement upon basic terminology or something approaching 
baseline ‘facts.’”190  The fundamental problem is the tendency to base voting 
and political decisions on ideological or religious dogma rather than a dearth 
of information.  When ideological and religious zealots are presented with 
facts inconsistent with their opinions, they cling to those opinions more 
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fiercely.191  More and more Americans obtain most of their information about 
politics from sources that do little more than confirm their world views.  Max-
well Stearns speaks of “information silos” and “the confirmation-biasing 
tendencies of the breakdown of traditional media.”192  American and global 
commitments to cultural pluralism are weakening.  The United States is ex-
periencing what has been described as “the Great Disinhibition,” as preju-
dices formerly kept in the closet now find increasing avenues for expres-
sion.193  Chinn’s paper in this symposium discusses “the weakening or 
disappearance of structures of commonality in American society” that allow 
for pluralism while containing the more tribal elements of pluralism.194  New 
methods of communication enable bigots to threaten, with near impunity, 
members of historically disadvantaged groups who seek to participate in pub-
lic discourse and disrupt intelligent conversations on matters of public im-
portance.195  Millions of Americans who would never march in a white su-
premacist rally nevertheless blame persons of color and immigrants for all 
the ills of their lives196 and see racial minorities, African-Americans in par-
ticular, as “special favorite[s] of the law.”197  The left as well as the right is 
wracked by problems of pluralism.  Much evidence indicates that persons 
who voted for Hillary Clinton and persons who voted for Bernie Sanders in 
the Democratic primary had difficulty holding civil political conversations 
with each other.198 
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The resulting polarization inhibits compromise between and within po-
litical parties and political movements.199  David Law points out how “the 
inherent reliance of social media on preexisting social ties and membership 
in self-selecting networks of affinity implies the tribalization of information 
flows: as reliance on social media for news continues to grow, both content 
and distribution will increasingly track preexisting tribal divisions.”200  Israel 
is one of many countries facing particularly virulent forms of these chal-
lenges.  Mordechay and Roznai note the increased political appeal in Israeli 
politics of anti-Arab racism and the Netanyahu administration’s efforts to en-
force cultural loyalty.201 
Economic equality, long thought to be a vital prerequisite to a function-
ing constitutional democracy, is decreasing sharply throughout the universe 
of constitutional democracy.  Ganesh Sitaraman declares, “The number one 
threat to American constitutional government today is the collapse of the 
middle class.”202  “The problem of economic insecurity,” Law observes, “is 
the Achilles heel of liberal democracy.”203  The top one percent in the United 
States and elsewhere has gained an increased share of the national wealth 
with substantial consequences for both electoral politics and economic mo-
bility.204  The upper-middle class and above is becoming increasingly im-
mune to downturns in the economy.  Poor citizens, a disproportionate number 
of which are persons of color, women, and children, gain the least during 
good economic times.205 
The combination of policy disasters by incompetent governing officials, 
prejudices inflamed by new media, information silos, and economic inequal-
ity is weakening commitments to constitutional democracy in the United 
States and throughout the world.  Law notes the increasing attractiveness of 
an Asian model in which democratic freedoms are few, but consumer goods 
are often plentiful.  His contribution suggests that ordinary citizens accept a 
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bureaucratic authoritarianism that makes trains (if not buses) run on time.206  
Constitutional arrangements, by comparison, may be producing the wrong 
goods.  “How compelling is the response that we constitutional lawyers 
have,” he asks, “as keepers of the faith in liberal constitutional democracy, to 
the argument that democracy is inherently vulnerable to some combination 
of ignorance, tribalism, and fear?”207 
The path of constitutional law influences constitutional retrogression at 
the margins,208 but no serious scholar claims that judicial decisions bear the 
brunt of the blame for poorly qualified political leaders, a badly informed 
public, weakened commitments to pluralism, and increasing economic ine-
quality.  Rather, the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of 
other constitutional democracies are constructing and constituting politics in 
ways that privilege the election of celebrities more interested in exploiting 
than understanding the political world, that privilege spokespersons for nar-
row interests and cultural fears at the expense of persons who speak for 
broader public interests, and that privilege global elites at the expense of the 
citizens needed to form a strong middle class.  The fault in the United States 
may lie in trying to operate an undemocratic and inefficient eighteenth-cen-
tury constitution in a twenty-first century world,209 in failing to acknowledge 
that “our constitutional democracy rests on premises that no longer hold,”210 
in a “thickening” of political time that prevents any substantive reform,211 or 
perhaps in a constitutional culture that is no longer capable of sustaining a 
constitutional democracy, but not in politics and law being too intertwined.  
Part II of this Essay details how law is no more or less integrated with politics 
at present than in the past.212  The problems with contemporary constitutional 
democracy lie in how law and politics are integrated.  We can obtain better 
constitutional law only by obtaining a better constitutional politics.  Dawood 
properly recognizes that “it is the interaction between constitutional and po-
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litical factors that will be determinative of” the survival of American consti-
tutional democracy, “rather than the strengths and deficiencies of the Consti-
tution on its own.”213 
Constitutional politics challenges the means offered by the New Deal 
conceptual universe for achieving constitutional reform.  That conceptual 
universe provides one place for constitutional change, points to the nine per-
sons who must be persuaded, and offers one language for persuasion.  Con-
stitutional politics provides multiple places for constitutional change, points 
to the different people who hold privileged positions in these different places 
who must be persuaded, and offers different persuasive languages for con-
vincing different persons in different places to make constitutional changes.  
Localities are alternatives to federal courts.  Some states granted same-sex 
couples the right to marry before the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. 
Hodges.214  Elected officials are alternatives to judges.  Gubernatorial com-
mutations, as well as judicial stays, halt executions.  Popular constitutional 
rhetoric is an alternative to legality.  Courts routinely reject legal claims based 
on the Declaration of Independence,215 but such constitutional rhetoric is of-
ten powerful when employed by political movements in electoral and legis-
lative settings.216 
This constitutional politics is more dynamic than the static world view 
presented by the law/politics distinction.  Americans throughout history have 
altered the places for constitutional change, the persons who must be per-
suaded, and the language of persuasion.  The constitutional powers of all 
branches of the national government have waxed and waned throughout 
American history.217  Political movements and elected officials constantly 
contest the partisan composition of the federal judiciary.218  Legal entrepre-
neurs transform the dominant methods of constitutional discourse.219  Re-
formers may nevertheless change these elements of constitutional politics 
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only by making creative use of the existing places where people may be per-
suaded, the people who must be persuaded, and the languages by which they 
might be persuaded. 
Constitutional politics can be improved only by politics.  Work that 
demonstrates the political foundations of judicial power undermines the in-
herited belief that law can protect us from politics, i.e., that if politics is the 
problem, then law is the solution.  The foundations for constitutional democ-
racy, which contemporary constitutional politics are undermining, can be 
buttressed only by materials found within contemporary constitutional or-
ders.  Quentin Skinner’s aphorism, “all revolutionaries . . . march backwards 
into battle,”220 captures how persons modifying or replacing a failing regime 
justify their reforms by using the language of the old constitutional order that 
their audience understands and accepts.  Julie Novkov’s work on the New 
Deal Constitutional Revolution details how Hughes Court Justices were able 
to provide constitutional foundations for minimum wage and maximum 
hours laws by ascribing longstanding characteristics of women workers to 
workers of all sexes.221  Stephen Skowronek observes how all new institu-
tions bear the imprint of the old institutions that gave birth to them.  The 
politics of the pre-administrative state in the United States, he details, struc-
tured the institutions of the administrative state.222  The Supreme Court has 
played a major role in American constitutional development because new co-
alitions coming to power consistently conclude that they will best promote 
their constitutional visions by modifying existing activist practices rather 
than by building a new federal judiciary.223 
The relationship between constitutional stability and constitutional 
change has important consequences for efforts to restore the preconditions of 
constitutional democracy in the United States and throughout the world.  No 
Archimedean point exists outside of politics that provides foundations for 
creating or imagining better constitutional regimes.  Successful reformers 
must acquire power either through existing channels of power or by using the 
tools that contemporary constitutional politics provides for modifying exist-
ing channels of power.  The means used by reformers to change the existing 
constitutional order will, in turn, structure the new constitutional order.  Re-
placing Donald Trump by impeachment has different constitutional conse-
quences than replacing Trump’s Republican Party by election. 
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The conceptual order schmoozers are fashioning celebrates good poli-
tics, abandoning the world view that demeaned all politics as a lower form of 
constitutional behavior.  This good politics consists of the persuasion, mobi-
lization, and policies necessary to sustain the conditions for constitutional 
democracy and to improve a regime’s capacity to realize constitutional ideals 
or, in the case of the United States, the American constitutional ideals.  This 
constitutional politics is a politics of better and worse rather than one of legal 
truth and error.  Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke the language of the New 
Deal conceptual universe when he rejoiced in the judicial capacity to provide 
litigants with “a whole loaf.”224  Constitutional politics offers no similar hope 
for redemption.  The half a loaf reformers we might gain, should their con-
stitutional efforts successfully persuade our fellow citizens of the virtues of 
intelligence, science, pluralism, and economic equality, seems meager from 
the Olympian heights of law.  Nevertheless, the bread obtained through con-
stitutional politics serves those throughout the world who are metaphorically 
starving for some justice and less metaphorically starving for any nourish-
ment. 
Abraham Lincoln concluded his second annual message to Congress by 
declaring, 
Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history.  We of this Congress 
and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves.  
No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or an-
other of us.  The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us 
down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.225 
We can no more escape politics than we can escape history.  Constitu-
tional democracy will survive the fiery trial through which those governing 
practices are passing only if constitutional democrats persuade our fellow cit-
izens of the virtues and preconditions of constitutional democracy through 
existing channels of communication and mobilization, or through the new 
channels of communication and mobilization they devise using the materials 
provided by contemporary constitutionalism.  A constitutional theory rooted 
in a constitutional politics committed to constitutional democracy must pro-
vide persuasive reasons for thinking that elected officials and political actors 
need experience and intelligence, that public policy must be based on sound 
science rather than religious or ideological dogma, that modern pluralist so-
cieties are here to stay and offer the best possibility for human flourishing, 
and that a constitutional democracy without a vibrant and diverse middle 
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class is a practical political contradiction.  If we as a collective, as a society 
and as a species fail in this constitutional endeavor, we may not be remem-
bered in spite of ourselves only because the high probability exists that our 
failure will leave no institutions capable of preserving memory or worse, no 
selves to do the remembering. 
